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ABSTRACT
The main question at issue is which view of copyright law the United States
should adhere to. Founders of American copyright law based our Constitution on
utilitarian principles that promote the spread of knowledge and information to the
general public. It has always been held that innovation and creativity were of core
importance in an efficiently functioning democracy. With the passing of Section
514, the United States digressed from its national roots in order to comply with an
international regime of copyright law. This decision in Golan takes steps to afford
private economic benefit to a few copyright holders at the expense of the public at
large: a notion against constitutional principles. Congress and the Supreme Court
have rationalized American compliance with international law at the great cost of
impeding education and culture, discouraging business and investment, and
creating a grey cloud over the public domain and copyright industry. Prior to this
decision, the United States has never succumbed to the pressures of international
adherence at national expense, and we should not start now. Again, if it is unfair
for the neighborhood to lose out on Granny’s fruit baskets, it is equally unfair on
the American public to lose access to works in the public domain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To depict the impact of following an international copyright regime on the
American public, imagine the following story about Granny. Granny is an elderly
woman whose joy in life, for the last thirty years, comes from religiously
gardening, planting, and maintaining her vegetable and flower beds. Not only does
she upkeep her own home and lawn, but additionally, Granny preserves the
adjoining property to her land on which stand a few fruit trees and some open
space where her grandchildren come to play. Over thirty years ago, when Granny
first moved to the neighborhood, she noticed the weeds and vines growing over an
old unused shack on her neighboring property. She visualized creating a spacious
area where she could grow fruits and vegetables, picnic with her family, and put a
swinging tire in for her grandchildren to enjoy during their yearly summer
vacations to her house. Granny is well aware of the limits on her property line, but
the adjoining land has been vacant for as long as she can remember, and she takes
pleasure in preserving the fruit trees, gardens, and lawn. The neighbors all believe
this property belongs to Granny, as she maintains the trees, collects the fruit each
harvest, and creates baskets to give to the families in the neighborhood. Over the
years, Granny believes that she became owner of the land through adverse
1
possession, as nobody has ever condemned her public use of the land. Now
imagine how Granny would feel if one day somebody decided to claim they owned
the land, and they could legally start charging her for the use of the trees and the
fruit. Granny is no longer allowed on the property without permission from a
random stranger claiming he owns the land. If Granny wishes to continue to share
the fruit with the neighborhood, as she has been freely doing for over thirty years,
she will be charged a fee determined by this unknown party. Considering that
Granny has been fairly and innocently utilizing the abandoned land for the benefit
of the neighborhood community, does this situation seem fair? Most likely not.
Essentially, this is an analogous property law illustration of the effect of the
2
Supreme Court’s recent copyright law decision in Golan v. Holder. The United
States of America was founded on a principle of separation of power between the
3
three branches of government. With respect to copyright law, in an effort to
comply with an international regime, Congress has taken it upon itself to take
works out of the American public domain and “restore” the authors’ rights in the
original works. Not only did Congress pass such legislation, but the Supreme
4
Court affirmed in Golan the constitutionality of this statute. Petitioners are
analogous to “Granny” depicted in the aforementioned scenario, and the impact of
1

JESSE DUKMINIER, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: PROPERTY 24 (Elizabeth L. Snyder et al. eds.,
2002). Adverse possession is a concept in property law: a process by which a premise can change
ownership without compensation, if the user of a certain piece of property establishes the requisite
elements and no claim is brought. The elements of adverse possession include: (1) actual possession,
(2) open and notorious use, (3) exclusivity, (4) hostile or adverse use, and (5) continuous use. Id. at 24–
30.
2
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
3
“[T]he separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve
to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power [between
the branches] will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse . . . .” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991).
4
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874.
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the legislation on the American public parallels that of the neighborhood
community. As illustrated above, had such measures been taken “with respect to
well-established property rights, the problem would be obvious. This statute
analogously restricts, and thereby diminishes, Americans’ preexisting freedom to
5
use formerly public domain material in their expressive activities.” However, the
Supreme Court and Congress did just that by affirming the Tenth Circuit’s
6
decision. This case note is a criticism of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
regarding copyright law in Golan. Part II of the case note illustrates the legislative
background, which frames the Supreme Court’s decision in the case. Part III
details the facts, procedure, and background presented to the Court. Next, Part IV
gives Justice Ginsberg’s reasoning on Supreme Court affirmation of the Tenth
Circuit decision, which is followed with Justice Breyer’s dissent. The subsequent
sections, Parts V and VI, specify aspects of contention and criticism with the
majority opinion, and outline the damaging impact of the decision on the American
public.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
In order to comprehend the Supreme Court’s decision in Golan, it is
necessary to understand the string of legislation, which creates the backdrop of the
7
Court’s reasoning. The Court’s analysis of the impact of each subsequently
passed legislative act in relation to the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
8
Constitution sheds light on the argument at issue. In regard to copyright, this
clause in the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . .
9
the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings and Discoveries.”
The primary accord governing international copyright law, effectuated in
10
1886, is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
11
(“Berne Convention” or “Berne”). The Berne Convention was devised to create
an international regime of copyright law, in which the 164 member countries agree
5

Id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
7
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Protection Act (“CTEA”), 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2012);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”); Uruguay Round
Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 109 (2000)). Title 17 of
the United States Code governs copyright law in America, where these agreements have been codified.
See Harmonizing Copyright’s Internationalization with Domestic Constitutional Constraints, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1798 (2008) (discussing the emerging international framework of copyright law through
various pieces of legislation and treatises).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
Id.
10
Berne Convention, art. 18, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force July 24, 1971).
The 1886 treaty has been subsequently modified: Berlin, 1908; Rome, 1928; Brussels, 1948;
Stockholm, 1967; and Paris, 1971, and amended in 1979. HOUSE REPORT OF THE BERNE CONVENTION
IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100–609 (1988).
11
Prior to the Berne Convention, national copyright laws typically only applied for works created
within each country. Harmonizing Copyright’s Internationalization with Domestic Constitutional
Constraints, supra note 7. For example, if a work was published in Germany, the German citizen
would be protected by copyright in Germany, however, the work could be copied or sold by anyone in
the United Kingdom. Similarly, if an original work was produced in France, it could be protected in
France, but not in another country.
6
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to comply with two major principals: (1) minimum rights and (2) national
12
treatment or reciprocity.
The minimum rights principle requires all member
13
countries to grant a basic level of protection recognized under this Convention.
The national treatment refers to the principle that member countries provide the
same protections to authors in other member countries as they provide to their own
14
authors. Interestingly, the United States did not become a signatory to the Berne
15
Convention until 1988, over a century later.
The core issue in Golan v. Holder revolves around Article 18 of the Berne
Convention, which “requires countries to protect the works of other member states
unless the works’ copyright term has expired in either the country where protection
16
is claimed or the country of origin.” Consequently, Article 18 requires that when
a country joins the Berne Convention, it must provide copyright protection to preexisting foreign works, even if such works were previously a part of the public
17
domain. In 1988, the United States joined the Berne Convention despite Article
18; however, America did not provide protection for any foreign works lodged in
18
the U.S. public domain.
Although Congress decided to join the Berne Convention, they took a

12

See Berne Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 2–19.
Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5 (Article 5 classifies the Rights Guaranteed.
Subsections (1) and (2) identify rights “Outside the country of origin”; subsection (3) identifies rights
“In the country of origin”; subsection (4) defines “Country of origin”).
14
Id.
15
The United States had an entirely different system of transnational copyright protection from its
European counterparts, where foreign works were excluded from protection under the Copyright Act.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873, 879 (2012). Copyright protection in the United States was largely based on
authors’ (both domestic and foreign) “compliance with notice, registration, and renewal formalities.”
Id. Joining would have required distinct changes to U.S. copyright laws: “As Congress considered
joining the Berne Convention, a major subject of its deliberations was whether Berne required the
United States to grant protection to any foreign works in the public domain of the United States, and
whether the Constitution permitted Congress to do so.” Brief for Petitioners at 5, Golan v. Holder, 132
S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2423674 at *5.
16
Berne Convention, art. 18: Works Existing on Convention’s Entry into Force, reads:
(1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its
coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of
origin through the expiry of the term of protection.
(2) If, however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was
previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of the country where
protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew.
(3) The application of this principle shall be subject to any provisions
contained in special conventions to that effect existing or to be concluded
between countries of the Union. In the absence of such provisions, the respective
countries shall determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of
application of this principle.
(4) The preceding provisions shall also apply in the case of new accessions to
the Union and to cases in which protection is extended by the application of
Article 7 or by the abandonment of reservations.
Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 18.
17
Id.
18
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874. “A different system of transnational copyright protection long
prevailed in this country. Throughout most of the 20th century, the only foreign authors eligible for
Copyright Act protection were those whose countries granted reciprocal rights to American authors and
whose works were printed in the United States.” Id. Violations of the Berne Convention were not
enforced at this time. Id.
13
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19

“minimalist approach” and adopted the Berne Convention Implementation Act
(“BCIA”), which did not grant any protections to foreign works already in the
20
American public domain. Thus, the United States was compliant with the Berne
Convention even without the restoration of foreign works already in the public
21
domain.
The United States’ non-compliance with the Berne Convention was
dismantled in 1994, by the creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), a
22
result of the multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Rounds.
TRIPs
extended protection, in compliance with Article 18, to all works of foreign origin
whose term of protection had not expired abroad, regardless of their status in the
23
public domain in the United States.
In response, Congress enacted Section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act (“URAA”), which “gave works enjoying copyright protection
24
abroad the same full term of protection available to U.S. works.” URAA Section
514 grants copyright protection to pre-existing works of Berne member countries,
protected in their country of origin, but lacking protection in the United States for
any of three reasons: (1) the United States did not protect works from the country
of origin at the time of publication; (2) the author failed to comply with U.S.
statutory formalities; or (3) the United States did not protect sound recordings
25
fixed before 1972.
This legislation does not “restore” copyrights in foreign
works that entered into the public domain through expiration of term of
26
protection.
Although Section 514 provides some protection for “reliance

19
Id. at 879. BCIA “made only those changes to American copyright law that [were] clearly
required under the treaty’s provisions.” Id.
20
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
21
Prior to 1994, the Berne Convention lacked teeth of enforceability because it allowed parties to
declare that they were not bound by the agreement. Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 33 (Article
33 governs Disputes. Subsection (1) outlines “Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”;
subsection (2) identifies “Reservation as to such jurisdiction”; subsection (3) discusses “Withdrawal of
reservation”). The Berne Convention did not specify sanctions for noncompliance, which permitted the
United States to be a member without conforming to the provisions set forth in Berne without
repercussion. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880–81.
22
See supra note 7. TRIPs was the result of multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Rounds,
which set forth the minimum standards governing intellectual property regulation and enforceable by
the WTO through dispute resolution. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881. TRIPs “mandated implementation of
Berne’s first 21 articles.” Id.
23
“The WTO gave teeth to the Convention’s requirements: Noncompliance with a WTO ruling
could subject member countries to tariffs or cross-sector retaliation.” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881.
24
Id. at 878.
25
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104,
109 (2000)).
26
The Berne Convention allows a copyright holder to receive protection for at least 50 years after
the death of the author. Berne Convention, supra note 10, at art. 7 (Article 7 governs the “Term of
Protection”). Therefore, if a work entered into the public domain due to expiration of this term, it will
not receive the right to restoration governed by Section 514. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B).
Prospectively, restoration places foreign works on an equal footing with their
U.S. counterparts; assuming a foreign and domestic author died the same day,
their works will enter the public domain simultaneously. Restored works,
however, receive no compensatory time for the period of exclusivity they would
have enjoyed before §514’s enactment, had they been protected at the outset in
the United States.
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27

parties,” (such as the plaintiffs in the case) the constitutionality of this legislation
is the core issue of Golan v. Holder.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioners in Golan v. Holder are a “broad range of artisans and
businesses” comprised of orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers,
and many others of the like, who have built their livelihoods upon the use of works
28
in the public domain.
They perform, distribute, sell, and exploit the publicly
29
available works. The central issue underlying this case is the constitutionality of
restoring copyright in a category of works produced by “foreign authors who lost
those rights to the public domain for any reason other than the expiration of a
30
copyright term.”
Congress’s enactment of URAA Section 514 was to the
detriment of petitioners—they were no longer able to freely enjoy the use of
works, which prior to this statutory enactment, were not protected by U.S.
31
copyright law.
In September 2001, petitioners brought suit against the
government challenging the constitutionality of Section 514 and the Copyright
32
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) under the Copyright Clause and the First
33
Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding
that there was “no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via
34
copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”
The
district court followed the presumption of statutes to be constitutional, and
acknowledged “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to
35
pursue the Constitution’s objectives.” Petitioners appealed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882.
27
A “reliance party” is defined as a person who:
(A) with respect to a particular work, engages in acts, before the source
country of that work becomes an eligible country, which would have violated
section 106 if the restored work had been subject to copyright protection, and
who, after the source country becomes an eligible country, continues to engage in
such acts;
(B) before the source country of a particular work becomes an eligible
country, makes or acquires 1 or more copies or phonorecords of that work; or
(C) as the result of the sale or other disposition of a derivative work covered
under subsection (d)(3), or significant assets of a person described in
subparagraph (A) or (B), is a successor, assignee, or licensee of that person.
17. U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4)(A)–(C).
28
Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.
2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
29
Id.
30
See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
31
Id.
32
See supra note 7. “Also known as the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the CTEA
increased the duration of existing and future copyrights from life-plus-50-years to life-plus-70-years.”
Golan v. Gonzales (Gonzales), 501 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2007).
33
See Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
34
Id.
35
Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01–B–1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754 *2 (D.Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).
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The Tenth
The appellate court affirmed in part and remanded in part.
Circuit foreclosed petitioners’ challenge to the CTEA based on the Supreme
37
Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft. However, the appellate court recognized
the need for legislation to fit within the express confines of the Constitution and
concluded petitioners had “shown sufficient free expression interests in works
removed from the public domain to require First Amendment scrutiny of [Section]
38
514.”
Consequently, the case was remanded back to the district court to address
39
this First Amendment issue in regards to Section 514. On remand, the district
court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment determining that “to the
extent Section 514 suppresses the rights of reliance parties to use works they
40
exploited while the works were in the public domain,” was unconstitutional.
41
This time, the government filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
held “the government ha[d] demonstrated a substantial interest in protecting
American copyright holders’ interests abroad, and Section 514 is narrowly tailored
42
to advance that interest,” and consequently reversed the lower court’s decision.
In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to contemplate petitioners’
challenge, under both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, of Section
43
514. The Supreme Court decided the case and Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was
given on January 18, 2012.
IV. OPINION ANALYSIS
A. Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioners’ challenge
that URAA Section 514 was unconstitutional under both the Copyright Clause and
44
45
the First Amendment. Justice Ginsburg was joined by a 6-2 majority affirming
36

See Golan, 609 F.3d at 1076.
Id.; see generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (petitioners sought a determination
that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause’s ‘limited Times’
prescription and the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. Supreme Court held the CTEA did not
exceed Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause, and furthermore, the legislation was not in
violation of the First Amendment).
38
Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187.
39
“We then remanded the case to the district court to assess whether [Section] 514 is content-based
or content-neutral and to apply the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny,” Golan, 609 F.3d at
1082 (internal quotations omitted). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id.
40
Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.
2010) aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
41
Government argued URAA § 514 did not violate the First Amendment. Golan II, 609 F.3d at
1082. Plaintiffs cross appealed claiming the lower court failed to enjoin the Attorney General from
enforcing the statute. Id.
42
Id. at 1083. In the appeal the government argued that Section 514 advanced three interests: (1)
compliance with international treatises and agreements, (2) legal protection of American copyright
holders’ interests abroad, and (3) to remedy foreign authors past inequities. Id. The Tenth Circuit
rejected arguments one and three, but found the government expressed an important government
interest in two. Id.
43
Id. at 1076.
44
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
45
Justice Breyer filed the dissent, with whom Justice Alito joins. Justice Kagan took no part in the
37
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the Tenth Circuit’s finding of Congress’s legislation to be “narrowly tailored to fit
the important government aim of protecting U.S. copyright holders’ interests
46
abroad,” and therefore within constitutional bounds. The opinion first addresses
Section 514 in light of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment,
47
respectively.
In regards to the Copyright Clause, petitioners’ argument focuses on the
“limited Times” language of the Constitution, which they contend is violated by
48
the ability to “remov[e] works from the public domain.” However, the Supreme
49
Court looks to their precedent set forth in Eldred to find the contrary. Justice
Ginsburg declines to accept a constricted meaning of the word “limited,” but rather
defines the term to mean “confine[d] within certain bounds, restrain[ed],” or
50
“circumscribed.”
Accordingly, she analogizes Section 514 to the CTEA and
does not find the copyright lifespan to be unlimited, and thus, is within the
51
constitutional limits as found in Eldred.
Furthermore, in regards to the Copyright Clause, petitioners argue that
historically federal copyright legislation has not affected works in the public
52
domain, thus distinguishing this case from Eldred. However, Justice Ginsburg
cites the Copyright Act of 1790 to illustrate that “the First Congress . . . did not
53
view the public domain as inviolate.”
Furthermore, Ginsburg references
subsequent unchallenged private bills that effectively restored copyrights of works
54
previously in the public domain. The Supreme Court respects the separation of
power between the government branches, as they do not question Congress’s

consideration or decision of this case. Id. at 877.
46
See id. at 875.
47
Id. at 878–82.
48
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 22. Petitioners’ believe the constitution is violated “by
turning a fixed and predictable period into one that can be reset or resurrected at any time, even after it
expires.” Id.
49
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2002). Similarly, in Eldred, petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the CTEA, which lengthened the term of the copyright by 20 years. Id. However,
the Supreme Court upheld the legislation, inferring a less restrictive meaning of the term “limited.” Id.
50
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
Justice Ginsburg refutes petitioners’ argument that the limited time passed for works in the public
domain, explaining “the copyrights of restored foreign works typically last for fewer years than those of
their domestic counterparts.” Id. Petitioners go one step further in concluding that with Congress’s
legislation “perpetual copyright terms would be achievable.” Id. However, the Supreme Court again
looks to Eldred to counter, explaining, “the hypothetical legislative misbehavior petitioners posit is far
afield from the case before us. . . . Congress can hardly be charged with a design to move stealthily
toward a regime of perpetual copyright.” Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 886. The Copyright Act of 1790 granted protection to maps, charts, books, or books
already printed, thus in the public domain, of the United States. Id.
54
Id. at 886–87. See Corson Act (1849); Helmuth Act (1874); Jones Act (1898); see also McClurg
v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843) (upholding Congress’s restoration of an invention to
protected status); Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815) (upholding Congress’s passage of a
private built restoring patent protection). In this discussion the Supreme Court includes Acts passed by
Congress in 1919 and 1941, which authorized the “President to issue proclamations granting protection
to foreign works that had fallen into the public domain during World Wars I and II.” Golan, 132 S. Ct.
at 887. But see Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966) (denying the authorization of issuance
of patents whose effects remove existent knowledge or restrict free access to materials already in the
public domain).
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55

political choice to embrace Berne unstintingly. Accordingly, the Court finds that
United States compliance with Berne’s international copyright regime is a “signal
56
event” justifying the restoration of works in the public domain.
Lastly, in regards to the Confrontation Clause, petitioners argue that Section
57
514 does not “spur the creation of . . . new works,” hence the federal legislation
58
does not “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Yet the Supreme
Court finds this argument invalid stating, “the creation of at least one new work . . .
59
is not the sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learning.” The Court
reasons the dissemination of works as an equivalent means to promote science and
60
the spread of knowledge, as the creation of new works. An efficient international
copyright system should encourage the spread of current and future works, thus
Congress believes full compliance with the Berne Convention would expand the
61
foreign market and stimulate the protection of privacy of U.S. works abroad.
The Court does not refute petitioners’ argument for the need to incentivize creation
of new works in order to advance and spread knowledge and learning. However,
the majority concedes that creation is not the sole way Congress may use to
“promote the Progress of Science,” taking a more flexible approach that aligns
62
with the standards of the Berne Convention.
Next, the Supreme Court tackles petitioners’ argument that Section 514’s
restoration offends First Amendment concerns of the guarantee of freedom of
expression. Again, the Court analogizes this case to Eldred, observing “that the
Framers regarded copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in
which expressive works may be used . . . [but] also saw copyright as an ‘engine of
63
free expression.’”
The Court believes “copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” and that copyright jurisprudence
64
accommodates the First Amendment.
Ginsburg explains that the fair use
65
66
defense and idea/expression dichotomy are inherent in copyright protection,

55

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887.
Id.
57
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 24.
58
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–88. “Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its
patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
59
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888. The Supreme Court again quotes its decision in Eldred, “rejecting the
notion that ‘the only way to promote the progress of science [is] to provide incentives to create new
works.’” Id. (citation omitted); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003).
60
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprs., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
61
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.
62
Id. at 888–89.
63
Id. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 558).
64
Id. The Supreme Court describes various accepted aspects of copyright protection including, the
fair use defense, idea/expression dichotomy, and speech protective purposes as the “traditional
contours” of copyright protection which accommodate for First Amendment concerns. Id.
65
In regards to fair use, which is codified at 17 U.S.C. §107, Ginsburg explains:
The fair use of copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . .
. for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.” This limitation on exclusivity “allows the public to
use not only facts and ideas contained in copyrighted work, but also [the
author’s] expression itself in certain circumstances.
56
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which balances the First Amendment and the Copyright Act. Through Section
514, Congress adopts a measure to simplify the United States’ transition to follow
an international copyright regime. Because Section 514 does not disturb the fair
use and idea/expression aspects of copyright law, the “speech protective purposes
68
and safeguards” are met. Encompassed in Section 514, Congress “deferred the
date from which enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration on
‘reliance parties’ who exploited foreign works [previously] denied protection,”
69
thus accounting for First Amendment concerns.
Although petitioners believe the First Amendment safeguards inherent in
copyright law infringe upon the “vested rights” they enjoyed in works that had
70
already entered the public domain, the Supreme Court rejects this notion. Again,
the Supreme Court capitalizes upon historical records to demonstrate that nothing
in “our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude for
71
copyrighted works that were once in the public domain.” Petitioners misinterpret
having “vested rights” in foreign works they believe they acquired when they were
72
able to utilize an unimpeded exploitation of such works. However, the Supreme
Court clarifies petitioners’ misconception of their “vested rights”: “[a]nyone has
free access to the public domain, but no one, after the copyright term has expired,
73
acquires ownership rights in the once protected works.” Through Section 514,
Congress does not “impose a blanket prohibition on public access,” because users
can exploit the works through fair use or by paying a royalty for the desired
74
exploitation of the author’s expression.
This legislation fully implements the
standards of the Berne Convention, which mandates both foreign and domestic
75
works be governed by the same legal regime.
The Supreme Court, along with Congress, believes “Section 514 continue[s]
the trend toward a harmonized copyright regime by placing foreign works in the
position they would have occupied if the current regime had been in effect when

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).
66
In regards to the idea/expression dichotomy, codified at 17 U.S.C. §102(b), Ginsburg writes:
In no case does copyright protec[t] . . . any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in [the copyrighted] work.”
“Due to this
[idea/expression] distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work
becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication”; the author’s expression alone gains copyright protection.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219), see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471
U.S. at 556.
67
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91.
68
Id. at 891.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 892.
73
Id. “Copyright in a work protected . . . vests initially in the author . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(2006). “Once the term of protection ends, the works do not revest in any rightholder. Instead, the
works simply lapse into the public domain.” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892.
74
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court acknowledges that would-be users can no longer
utilize the foreign works free of charge. However, the right to perform a musical work can be obtained
in the marketplace, which users acquire through monetary compensation to U.S. authors. Id.
75
Id.
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The Supreme Court finds this
those works were created and first published.”
legislation to be within the confines of the Constitution under the belief that there
is a great need for the United States to comply with an international copyright
77
regime.
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer dissents because in his view, the Copyright Clause does not
authorize Congress to enact this statute because it does not encourage anyone to
78
produce a single new work.
Breyer understands the “economic philosophy
behind the Copyright Clause” to be one which grants copyright holders a limited
monopoly via private benefit for the public purpose of eliciting the creation of new
79
works.
As the majority finds historical precedent in governing its viewpoint,
Breyer cites the Statute of Anne as the basis for the Framers’ construction of the
80
Constitution. This statute encouraged “learned Men to compose and write useful
Books,” hence encouraged the creation of works, not merely the dissemination as
81
the majority notes.
Breyer identifies and contrasts two underlying views of copyright law: the
“utilitarian view” generally recognized in the United States, and the “natural rights
82
view” generally followed in continental European copyright law. The utilitarian
view, followed by Founders of the Constitution Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, embraces the notion that the monopoly granted to copyright authors
83
serves as “compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community.” The
Founders believe this monopoly encourages authors to pursue ideas and create
84
works, which may produce utility to the benefit of the general public. This view
contrasts the “natural rights” view grounded in the notion that “author[s] and
85
inventor[s] have inherent rights to the fruits of their labor.” The natural rights
theory heightens the importance of authors’ rights, as opposed to the importance of
86
social gain, highlighted in the utilitarian view.
This legislation takes works from the public domain, and restores copyright
76

Id.
Id. at 893–94.
78
Id. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 900. Breyer analogizes this monopoly as a two-edged sword. Id. On one side, it
encourages production of new works because absent copyright protection, works could be freely
exploited without having to incur the cost of creation; consequently, this would deter authors from
producing new works. Id. On the other side, copyright protection restricts dissemination due to the
economic marketplace and high administrative costs it imposes. Id.
80
See supra text accompanying note 54. The Statute of Anne is Britain’s 18th Century copyright
statute. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in
the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427,
1444–50 (2010) (stating that the objective of copyright was to encourage authors to produce new works
and thereby improve learning).
82
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83
Id. at 901 (citation omitted).
84
Id. at 901–02; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379 (J.Looney ed. 2009).
85
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 902 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86
Id.
77
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to foreign authors. The dissent analyzes the two ways in which this legislation
88
restricts the dissemination of such works. First, consumers that previously used
works for free are now charged fees by “restored copyright holders,” and second,
89
the legislation creates administrative costs.
The administrative burden is
particularly high in what the dissent identifies as “orphan works”; these are
millions of works of minimal commercial value whose copyright owners are nearly
90
impossible to identify.
Since the legislation creates high costs to utilize these
works, it essentially prevents use of culturally invaluable material to the public,
thus “aggravating the already serious problem of cultural education in the United
91
States.”
Justice Breyer concedes “that ordinary protection also comes with
dissemination-restricting royalty charges and administrative costs”; however, he
deems the costs imposed by this legislation to be especially harmful and
92
inordinately high.
Historically, “Congress has long sought to protect public
93
domain material when revising the copyright law.”
However with this
legislation, Congress’s ability to take works from the public domain “abridges” the
American public’s constitutionally inherent right to freedom of speech granted by
94
the First Amendment.
Moreover, Justice Breyer identifies restricting use of
previously available material, reversing payment expectations of existing users of
87
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”) § 514, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified 17 U.S.C. §§ 104,
109 (2000)). See supra note 7.
88
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 904–05. The dissent identifies administrative costs “as the costs of determining whether a
work is the subject of a restored copyright, searching for a restored copyright holder, and negotiating a
fee.” Id. at 905 (internal quotations omitted).
90
Id. “According to European Union figures there are 13 million orphan books in the European
Union (13% of the total number of books in-copyright there), 225,000 orphan films in European film
archives, and 17 million orphan photographs in United Kingdom museums.” Id.
91
Id. The dissent exemplifies the problem by stating:
[T]he Los Angeles Public Library has been unable to makes its collection of
Mexican folk music publicly available because of problems locating copyright
owners, that a Jewish cultural organization has abandoned similar efforts to make
available Jewish cultural music and other materials, or that film preservers,
museums, universities, scholars, database compilers, and others report that the
administrative costs associated with trying to locate foreign copyright owners
have forced them to curtail their cultural, scholarly, or other work-preserving
efforts.
Id. at 905–06.
92
Id. at 906. Although Justice Breyer believes the majority is correct in its analytical process, the
majority stops its inquiry, as they did in Eldred, by concluding that copyright law inherently restricts
dissemination or works and has associated administrative costs; see supra text accompanying notes 64–
66. However, the dissent distinguishes the current issue from Eldred, because unlike in Eldred, in this
case “an easily administrable standard is available—a standard that would require works that have
already fallen into the public domain to stay there.” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93
Golan, 132 S. Ct at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S.
470, 484 (1974) (stating trade secret protection is compatible with the policy of keeping works in the
public domain there); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (not allowing Congress to
authorize patents that effectively remove existent knowledge from the public domain). Contra supra
note 54.
94
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This will place an additional burden on
American consumers of these works, who will now have to seek answers to questions such as, “Is the
work eligible for restoration under the statute? If so, who now holds the copyright—the author? an
heir? a publisher? an association? a long-lost cousin? Whom must we contact? What is the address?
Suppose no one answers? How do we conduct a negotiation?” Id.
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these works, and rewarding individuals at the public’s expense, as examples of the
95
For the purposes of this case, the
speech-related harms created by this Act.
96
dissent limits its finding to show only the presence of a First Amendment issue.
The core of the dissent’s arguments comes from its conclusion that the Act
does not provide the public with the incentive to produce new works, which it
97
Additionally, the
identifies to be the essence of American copyright law.
argument enumerates a “virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing the
withdrawal of works from the public domain,” directly contradicting the findings
98
of the majority opinion. Furthermore, the dissent is at despair with the majority’s
interpretation that the Copyright Clause does not require the creation of new
99
works, but rather, can promote its motives in other ways. This Act “for the most
part covers works that the author[s] did not expect to protect in America,” hence
100
Justice Breyer finds the majority’s conclusion to be false.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Foundation of American Copyright Law: Historical Precedent
In order to evaluate the Supreme Court decision in Golan, it is essential to
look at how the Framers interpreted the Copyright Clause, and what they intended
101
to accomplish through American copyright law.
Modern day copyright law in
95
Id. at 907–08. It will be difficult for members of society such as artists, musicians, universities,
and scholars that previously enjoyed the works in the American public domain to obtain permission to
use any lesser known foreign work, with the additional burden of now owing payment to the original
authors for works they have long been using. Id. at 905.
96
“I need not decide whether the harms to that interest show a violation of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 907.
97
Id. at 908. This directly contradicts the majority’s conclusion that the Copyright Clause does not
“operate to induce new works.” Id. at 888 (majority opinion). Therefore, the essence of this debate is
whether the Constitution should be interpreted to induce the creation of new works, or if the
dissemination of works (as the majority believes) will suffice as a means of promoting the “Progress of
Science.” Id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 909. See, e.g., Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102
Stat. 2860 (1988); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (all pieces of
legislation that did not extend protection to works in the public domain). The majority opinion
references legislation, which retroactively granted protection, as the legislation at issue does. See supra
note 54. However, the dissent distinguishes this line of legislation because they were granted in special
circumstances, such as wartime, natural disasters, and the like. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 909 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer finds it “farfetched” to analogize those laws to the present law. Id.
99
Id. at 909–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “The industry experts to whom the majority refer argue
that copyright protection of already existing works can help, say, music publishers or film distributors
raise prices, produce extra profits, and consequently lead them to publish or distribute works they might
otherwise have ignored.” Id. at 909. However, this is flawed because, as the dissent points out, “simply
making the industry richer does not mean the industry . . . will distribute works not previously
distributed.” Id. at 910. This argument by the majority basically states that giving extra monetary
reward to authors for already created works will somehow incentivize these authors to create new
works. However, this view does not acknowledge “the special economic circumstances that surround
the nonrepeatable costs of the initial creation of ‘Writing.’” Id. at 901. Thus, the dissent reads the
Copyright Clause, unlike the majority, to encourage the creation of new works for the progress of
society.
100
Id. at 909.
101
Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Forcing the Copyright Genie Back into the Bottle: Public Policy
Implications of Copyright Extension Legislation, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 327, 338 (2004) (“The Framers of
the Constitution recognized that a constantly refreshed public domain is essential because it serves as a
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the United States should align with its historical roots as determined by our
Founding Fathers. The objective of early American copyright statutes “was to
102
encourage authors to produce new works and thereby improve learning.”
Through their letters, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison emphasized the “high
democratic value of access to knowledge,” while remaining wary of
103
monopolies.
Jefferson and Madison grounded the foundation of the
Constitution under a belief that an informed public was essential to a functioning
104
democratic system.
This demonstrates the Framers’ intent was to encourage
105
“creativity and innovation via a balanced system of incentives.”
The Framers embraced a utilitarian view of copyrights and patents, which
provides authors with compensation for the benefits gained by society through the
106
publication of their works.
In the utilitarian perspective, monopolies encourage
107
people to pursue ideas that produce utility.
This stands at odds with the
continental European basis for copyright law, which follows the natural rights
108
theory.
According to this dichotomy, copyright law founded in coherence with
the utilitarian theory should encourage works to remain in the public domain, in
109
order to benefit the greatest number of people.
However, it seems with Section
514, Congress has deviated from the roots of American copyright law in an effort
to follow an international regime.
The majority argues that this legislation is an attempt to put foreign
110
copyright holders on the same foot as their American counterparts.
However,
this Court fails to acknowledge that this legislation gives preferential treatment to
111
foreign authors who did not follow certain regulations and statutory formalities.
foundation of new works.”).
102
Kuhne, supra note 101, at 330 (discussing how American copyright law provides incentives for
control and opportunities for profit in order to motivate authors and artists to create original works).
103
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, “the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to warrant anything other than their
suppression.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 443 (J. Boyd ed., 1956).
104
See Brief for Public Domain Interests, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–26,
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470829. James Madison wrote, “A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” Letter
from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (1910).
105
Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 26; see U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (“Congress in 1790 enacted the first federal patent and
copyright law, 1 Stat. 109, and ever since that time has fixed the condition upon which patents and
copyrights shall be granted. These laws . . . are the supreme law of the land.”); Brief of H. Tomas
Gomez-Arostegui & Tyler T. Ochoa as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470823 (concluding the historical record does not support the
view that the First Congress believed it was removing works from the public domain by enacting the
1790 Act).
106
See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
107
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108
“Premised on the idea that an author or inventor has an inherent right to the fruits of his labor.”
Id. at 902. The natural rights view places a stronger emphasis on the rights of the authors, rather than
the advancement of public welfare. Id.
109
Id.
110
See supra text accompanying note 76.
111
Brief for Creative Common Corp. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 6, Golan v.
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American counterparts have made the same mistakes as foreign authors, yet are not
112
afforded any recourse.”
The United States was over a century late in signing the Berne Convention,
and did not find the need to implement Article 18 until 1994, when Section 514
113
Originally, Article 18 was not implemented because of concerns
was adopted.
over the constitutionality of restoring copyrights to works existing in the public
domain, thus showcasing Congress’s reservations to comply with an international
114
standard.
Congress’s decision to adhere to the international system set forth by
115
Berne was to highlight the government’s interest
in “persuad[ing] foreign
countries to allow American holders of preexisting copyrights to charge foreign
116
customers more money for their products.”
Congress believed retroactivity
would be the best way to gain protection of American copyright holders in
117
emerging foreign markets.
However, this argument places the concerns of a
private benefit over the public benefit, which goes against the grain of which our
118
Constitution was founded.
In cases regarding intellectual property, the Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of materials in the public domain. In regards to patent law, the
Court has adhered to a utilitarian theory stating, “[t]he efficient operation of the
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470826.
112
Id. American authors are not granted copyright restoration or relief from their failure to follow
copyright formalities, unlike foreign authors who benefit from Section 514. See Brief of Justice and
Freedom Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012)
(No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470825. This essentially, “tak[es] the right to speak from some and giv[es] it
to others.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
113
See supra text accompanying note 15.
114
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 51 (1988), quoted in 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 24:21 (2008).
115
“But there is no legitimate interest in giving away public speech rights in the hope of creating
private economic windfalls. Nor was there any substantial evidence to conclude the government’s giveaway would be reciprocated, or to what degree, and to what specific benefit.” Brief for Petitioners,
supra note 15, at 17.
116
Golan, 132 S. Ct at 910 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “[F]ailure to [comply with Article 18] will . . .
undermine the ability of the United States to press other countries to implement the same sort of
protection in their implementing legislation currently pending . . . around the globe.” Id. (statement of
Matt Gerson, Vice President for Congressional Affairs, Motion Picture Assn. of America) (statement of
Eric Smith, Executive Director and General Counsel, International Intellectual Property Alliance).
117
Id.
While the protection of U.S.-based copyright holders can certainly be a
substantial interest, the connection between that interest and Section 514 literally
depends upon speculation and conjecture regarding the conduct of other
sovereign nations. While the political branches have discretion to make
judgments in areas of foreign relations (Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242
(1984)), this does not give them carte blanche to set up any given policy as a
substantial government interest because of its hoped-for indirect effects on other
countries’ actions towards U.S. stakeholders. When a proposed regulation
impacts constitutional concerns at a level requiring more than cursory scrutiny,
there must be a definite, direct, and material relationship between the foreign
government’s protection of U.S. interests and the statute that faces constitutional
scrutiny.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner at 10, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470822 (emphasis added).
118
It is an argument of how to obtain more money from the sales of existing products versus how to
promote and protect the creative and innovative process. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 910 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known,
119
unpatented design.”
The Patent Clause in the Constitution reflects the “balance
120
between the need to encourage innovation,” and avoid monopolies.
Congress
does not authorize “patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from
121
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”
Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously stated that issuing patents to already
publicly held information would “serve no socially useful purpose, but would in
122
fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.”
Therefore, it follows that American copyright law precedent favors the stimulation
of creative works and monopolies, for the purpose of disbursing knowledge for the
123
greatest public gain.
The Supreme Court in Golan has digressed from its
historical precedent and has deviated from the “bedrock principle” of American
124
copyright law by restoring copyrights in works already in the public domain.
In light of the global economy, it is understandable that Congress feels
pressure to comply with the international system of copyright law set forth in
Berne. However, the United States enjoyed the benefits of Berne for years without
125
implementing Article 18.
Compliance with the Berne Convention did not
require Congress to enact retroactive protection; it only required some level of
protection to be given to works of foreign authors that had entered the American
126
public domain.
Congress had the option to take advantage of benefits of Berne
127
through less-restrictive methods of compliance.
Removing works from the
119
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). “Ever since the first U.S.
patent statute, the patent system appears to have incorporated a strong vision of the divide between
patentable inventions and technology in the public domain.” Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 977–78 (1990).
120
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
121
Id. See Kellog Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (holding that when a patent
falls into the public domain through the disappearance of a monopoly, the public shall be entitled to full
enjoyment of that which has become theirs).
122
Bonita, 489 U.S. at 148. The 1976 Copyright Act states that copyright protection does not
extend to “any work that goes into the public domain.” Brief of ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578555.
123
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(creativity should be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (stating that works once in the public domain should remain there is
not a policy incompatible with trade secret protection.); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) (stating the main objective of monopolies is to derive benefit to the general public by labors of
authors).
124
The “bedrock principle” of copyright law: “[W]orks in the public domain remain in the public
domain.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 43.
125
See supra text accompanying notes 18–21.
126
“Article 18(3) also states that ‘the respective countries shall determine, each in so far as it is
concerned, the conditions of application of this principle.’” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 18 U.N.T.S. 251). The plain terms of Berne would have allowed the United States
to burden substantially less speech, through the “rule of the shorter term” and “protect[ion] of first sale
rights.” Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 59–60. “[T]he scope of that protection is essentially
left to the discretion of each member state.” See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Daniel J. Gervais in
Support of Petitioners at 6, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470824.
127
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, the United States obtained
concession regarding the issue of moral rights protection under Berne, Article 6 ibis, which is of great
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public domain goes against constitutional principles, and should have been handled
128
with more caution.
Regardless of the method with which Congress decided to comply with
Berne, “no treaty can authorize the government to do what the Constitution
otherwise prohibits”; Congress overreached its arms with the enactment of Section
129
514.
This Court has previously established that the government’s chosen means
130
must not be “substantially broader than necessary.”
As it did in Eldred,
Congress was free to set the term of copyright as long as it was “limited” while
131
still complying with the Constitution.
“[I]f the Progress Clause is to be
accorded any substantial meaning,” the Supreme Court should not have allowed
Congress to overstep its powers by allowing restoration of works already in the
132
public domain.
The Framers purposely imposed specific limits on Congress’s
power in regards to copyright law in order to ensure it would promote, not inhibit,
133
the diffusion of knowledge.
B. Distinguishing Eldred
The Supreme Court falsely relies on the precedent set forth in Eldred, where
134
it upheld the constitutionality of CTEA,
because the Court does not
acknowledge key distinguishing factors between Eldred and the present case. The
CTEA, unlike Section 514, only applied to works under (non-expired) copyright
135
protection, it did not remove any works from the public domain.
“Section 514,
by contrast, deprives Petitioners, amici and their patrons of access to speech that
136
already belonged to the public.”
At most, the plaintiffs in Eldred could show a
weak interest in “making other people’s speeches,” but at no point possessed
137
unimpeded access to the works in question.
Conversely, Petitioners in Golan
freely and rightfully used the “work[s] without restriction, spread its contents, and
importance in European countries. Brief of Gervais, supra note 126, at 5–6. “The plain terms of
Article 18 would have allowed the United States to negotiate agreements that modified or eliminated
Berne’s restoration requirements to accommodate the unique position of the United States relative to
any other Berne signatory.” Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 55. Therefore, Congress could
have attempted to similarly negotiate terms regarding works of foreign authors already in the public
domain, without adopting such extreme measures. Id.
128
Brief of Gervais, supra note 126, at 8.
129
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 51; see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988). “No
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.” Id. at 324 (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
130
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). “It would not be contended that
[treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character
of the government or in that of one of the States . . . .” De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
131
Brief for Creative Common, supra note 111, at 20.
132
Id.
133
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
134
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) Pub. L. No. 105–298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828
(1998) (extending the term of existing (non-expired) copyrights for 20 years.). See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2002).
135
CTEA, supra note 134.
136
Brief Amici Curiae American Library Ass’n, et al., in Support of Petitioners at 28, Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533007.
137
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
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use[d] it in the creation of still other works.”
Moreover, the CTEA was generic
139
in nature because it “did not legislate with respect to any particular work.”
It
was a subpart of a general statute which extended copyright protection to
140
subsisting and future works.
On the other hand, Section 514 restores rights in a
select group of works to a particular group of rightsholders, which is not justified
141
by the decision in Eldred.
Such “targeted restoration,” not only “render[s] the
public domain perpetually vulnerable,” but is divergent from historical
142
precedent.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have followed the precedent it
143
set forth regarding works in the public domain,
rather than using the Eldred
reasoning as justification for their decision.
VI. IMPACT
A. Culture, Education, and Scholarship
It is essential to understand the span of works in the public domain that are
subject to restoration through Section 514 in order to comprehend the breadth of
144
damage caused by this legislation.
The category of works that derive restored
protection are those “that are (1) old; (2) of foreign origin; (3) protected under nonU.S. law; and that (4) failed to comply with United States’ copyright
145
146
‘formalities.’”
These works are in the millions and are representative of a
147
148
wide array of genres published abroad from 1932 to 1989.
The public domain is the truest form of free speech, as it benefits society at
149
The works
large by giving access to a realm of materials that can be freely used.
in the public domain become cultural building blocks and the “basis for our art, our

138

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 3.
Brief for the Creative Common, supra note 111, at 19.
140
Id. at 18. “The CTEA continued a practice begun with the Act of 1831, extending the term of
subsisting copyrights when it extended the term for new copyrights.” Id.
141
Id. at 19.
142
Id.
143
See supra text accompanying notes 119–23.
144
See Berne Convention art. 18, supra note 16.
145
Brief of Google Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533006.
146
Since the passage of Section 514 in 1994, over 50,000 registration notices have been filed with
U.S. Copyright Office, by foreign authors. See Notices of Restored Copyrights, UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.copyright.gov/gatt.html. “The works that qualify for
copyright restoration probably number in the millions.” Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office, Library of Cong., The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S.
Copyright Office (April 11, 1996), in 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 31 (1996).
147
The genres of works affected span from musical compositions, cinematographic works, books
and writings, paintings and pictures, etc. See Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 5–6
(“This encompasses wide swathes of our cultural building blocks, including, for example, all Russian
works published before 1973, including works by Vladimir Nabokov, Maxim Gorky, Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, and Sergei Prokofiev, paintings by Pablo Picasso, drawings by M.C. Escher, and writings
by such authors as George Orwell, J.R.R. Tolkien, and Virginia Woolf.”).
148
Golan, 132 S. Ct at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149
See Litman, supra note 119, at 966 (discussing how the creations of most new works stem from
usage of works already in the public domain).
139
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150

Prior to this decision, defining the
science, and our self understanding.”
boundaries of the public domain and intellectual property has been of great
151
importance to the Supreme Court.
This Court previously iterated the
significance of these boundaries in regards to patents by stating, “[a] patent holder
152
should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.”
The advent of new technologies makes it increasingly possible for works in
the public domain to be disseminated to millions of people in more ways than
153
In today’s world, “the public’s historic legal rights of access to these
before.
154
materials [are] a practical reality.”
Cultural institutions, non-profit educational
resources, and businesses “seek to serve the global community by collecting and
sharing” work in the public domain through digital libraries and encyclopedias,
155
digital repositories, and internet archives.
Technology, most importantly the
Internet, makes it simple for individuals to utilize “millions of public domain texts,
156
films, and sound recordings with ease,” at a fraction of the cost.
Use of these
works by the general public, fuels constitutional principles, by promoting creativity
157
in the arts and sciences.
In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt deemed the
public domain to be the source of “the great tools of scholarship, the great
repositories of culture, and the great symbols of freedom of the mind”; an essential
158
component to the “functioning of a democratic society.”
The purpose of copyright law and the public domain is to give the public
159
access to materials to fuel innovation and creativity —an unstable public domain

150
JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 39 (2008).
Boyle believes the public domain is comprised of “the raw material from which we make new
inventions and create new cultural works.” Id. “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.” CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395
(1981).
151
“Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through
access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated
as clearly as possible.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994).
152
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
153
Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136. “Thanks to the Internet and other new
technologies, Amici are able to preserve and share a vast wealth of information, allowing a virtually
unlimited number of patrons worldwide access to digitized books, photographs, music, and other
works.” Id. at 1.
154
Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 11.
155
See Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 1; Brief for Google, supra note 144.
156
Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 9. “[D]igital reproduction and distribution
can be far less expensive than older distribution forms, public domain materials can be distributed,
reproduced, and recombined on a vast scale.” Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 18.
157
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution is founded on the principle to promote creativity
for the “Progress of Science.” Id.
158
PATTI CLAYTON BECKER, BOOKS AND LIBRARIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY DURING WORLD WAR II:
WEAPONS IN THE WAR OF IDEAS 49 (2005).
159
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.’ To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” (citation
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975).
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has the exact opposite effect.
It is essential the public domain be clearly bound
and set apart from the domain of monopoly. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
created a haze over this line of separation through the enactment of Section 514,
the unconstitutional impact of which will halt the spread of culture and education
161
in the United States.
The parties most “affected by Section 514 are neither
copyright holders nor reliance parties, but rather members of the general public
who regularly rely on (or would benefit from access to) public domain works that
are, or could be, made available online for information, educational, and creative
162
purposes.”
Works affected by Section 514 are removed from the public domain,
163
which effectively shrinks the pool of information available to the public.
This
consequently diminishes the public’s right to receive information, and more
164
importantly, the voice of the community.
Much of culture and education in the United States stems from the various
165
For
expressions and interpretations of materials originally in the public domain.
example, “Walt Disney drew from the public domain to create prolific, culture166
defining films like Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.”
Websites like
Wikipedia provide a wealth of information comprised of massive collaborations,
167
millions of articles, and hundreds of languages.
The impact of Section 514 on the “Progress of Science and useful Arts,” is
168
Post implementation of Section 514,
vividly illustrated in the music industry.
many conductors and orchestras were required to pay rental fees on “landmark
works of twentieth-century music . . . by Prokofiev, Stravinsky, Shostakovich, and
169
others.”
Outside of the few wealthy institutions that could afford to rent the
rights to perform these works, the financial burden on smaller local and regional
170
music organizations has been tremendous.
This has a “debilitating effect on
171
music scholarship.”
This legislation has the same crippling effect in film,
160

Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 18; see discussion infra Part VI.C.
See generally Briefs as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
162
Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 4.
163
Id.
164
Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 27. “[Section 514] inhibits the spread of
existing works, reduces the universe of material available to the public for further creation, and
threatens to destroy the incentive to use even those works that remain unprotected. It impedes both the
creation of knowledge and its spread.” Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 15, at 24.
165
See Litman, supra note 119, at 966–67.
166
Brief for Creative Commons, supra note 111, at 6. There were at least three other film
adaptations to Snow White before Walt Disney created the hit animation film. Brief for Peter
Decherney as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No.
10-545), 2011 WL 2470832. In many films it is the audience’s familiarity with characters, story lines,
plots, and a fan-base that turns movies into major blockbusters. Id. This is true for many Disney hits
such as Little Red Riding Hood, Alice in Wonderland, Aladdin, and Jack and the Beanstalk, all of
which, absent works in the public domain, would not have been possible. Id. at 17.
167
Brief for Creative Commons, supra note 111, at 7.
168
See Brief of the Conductors Guild and the Music Library Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470828.
169
Id. at 2.
170
Id. A librarian at a music conservatory warns that if the affected works become “too expensive
to buy, no one will explore their performance or undertake their recordings. We will curtail intellectual
curiosity and diminish our cultural heritage.” Id. at 13.
171
Id. “All of these developments lessened the ability of music libraries to fulfill their educational
and public-service missions.” Id. at 6. Many people will be required to “cease activities such as
161
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media, and various other industries—industries that were effectively created by the
172
Furthermore, this legislation has the potential to hinder society’s
public domain.
173
use of technological advancements.
The possibility of harms caused to the
public through this legislation is endless.
B. Frivolous First Amendment Safeguard Provisions
The Supreme Court references the “built in First Amendment
174
accommodations,”
of the “fair use defense” and the “idea/expression”
175
dichotomy as speech protective outlets and safeguards, which still allow society
176
to use the works affected by Section 514.
However, by no means are these
provisions an adequate substitute or appropriate compensation for removing works
177
from the public domain.
Neither of these safeguards would allow the public to
178
create derivative interpretations or perform the works in their entirety.
It is a
stretch for Congress to believe these safeguards, which provide limited access to
copyrighted materials, are a justification for withdrawing works in which the
179
general public previously had unfettered access.
Many times, it is necessary to
180
replicate the exact expression of the work for its use to be valuable.
Moreover,
even if the copyright holder does grant permission of use, they are permitted to
181
demand license fees that can fall outside the budget of many creators.
It is
performing or experimenting with works they have spent decades mastering, unless they obtain the
‘rightsholders’ consent, which may be withheld for any reason, or no reason at all.” Brief for Google,
supra note 144, at 18–19.
172
See Brief of Decherney, supra note 165 (arguing the public domain facilitated the birth and
expansion of the film industry, brought stability to Hollywood, and allowed the founding of cinematic
genres).
173
See Amicus Brief on Behalf of Project Petrucci, L.L.C., in Support of Petitioners at 27–28,
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578554. This legislation also has the
potential of hindering public use of technological advancements. The International Music Score
Library Project (“IMSLP”) launched an iPad application allowing users to access sheet music on their
mobile devices. Id. Instead of orchestra’s paying costly per-performance fees, they could have
instantaneous, unlimited, and free access to thousands of IMSLP’s scores via application, thus never
paying for sheet music again. Id. The potential of the public domain through these types of
technological advancements are endless. Id.
174
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002).
175
See supra text and accompanying notes 65–66. Fair use and idea/expression dichotomy
provisions are codified by 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 102(b), respectively.
176
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
177
“Neither fair use nor the idea/expression dichotomy addresses all the ways in which copyright
restrictions can abridge freedom of speech.” Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 26.
178
Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir.). The fair use defense is confined to the
standard of what types of use a “reasonable copyright owner” may have consented to. Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1939). Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy only
applies to “idea, theory, and fact in . . . copyrighted work[s].” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. Therefore, both
safeguards are extremely limited in their ability to disseminate the restored works in a capacity that
would prove useful to anyone other than the rightholder.
179
“By withdrawing works from the public domain, § 514 leaves scholars, artists, and the public
with less access to works than they had before the Act.” Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195. The main concern is
one of public interest and public necessity. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment:
Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010).
180
“Playing a few bars of a Shostakovich symphony is no substitute for performing the entire
work.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 47.
181
See Brief of the Conductors Guild, supra note 167, at 7. For example, one conductor stated his
group would no longer perform a number of Igor Stravinsky’s works they previously performed
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implausible to think these are adequate measures to alleviate the burden placed on
182
prospective authors and the general public.
The Supreme Court references other measures Congress adopted to ease the
transition of parties affected by the loss of access to restored works: “[i]t deferred
the date from which enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration
on ‘reliance parties’ who exploited foreign works denied protection before
183
[Section] 514 took effect.”
Yet again, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of
Congress’s attempt to rectify the damage done by the enactment of Section 514 is
184
troubling given the digital age upon us.
The one-year grace period afforded is a
provision set in place so reliance parties can disseminate copies of the works made
185
before they were put on notice by the Federal Register.
In the Internet age, most
distribution of works occurs online via downloads and websites. However, after a
reliance party is given notice, the statute requires websites to immediately rectify
and comply with the provisions of the legislation, or run the risk of facing
186
liability.
As a result, most reliance parties, out of fear of facing liability, do not
187
really benefit from the grace period Congress identifies.
C. Business and the Copyright Industry
The statute provides that any reliance party that wishes to utilize a restored
work can do so by negotiating adequate compensation with the rightsholders, or
188
paying what the district court determines is a reasonable amount.
However,
with regard to “orphan works,” this seemingly reasonable provision can result in
because the fees to perform, post enactment of Section 514, are at least $300, which is outside the
budget of the ensemble. Id. Similarly, a conductor for a university orchestra reported fees to rent
certain essential pieces of compositions can exceed $1,200. Id.
182
“Users and secondary authors cannot simply rely on the existence of fair use; it must be
privately litigated based on a different set of facts each time it is invoked.” Brief of Amici Curiae,
Information Society Project at Yale Law School Professors and Fellows, in Support of Petitioners at 21,
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470834.
183
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
184
See Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 14.
185
17 U.S.C § 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(III)–(B)(ii)(III). As against reliance parties, all of 17 U.S.C §
504’s copyright infringement remedies are available if copies or phonorecords of a restored work are
made after either (i) publication in the Federal Register of notice of intent to enforce copyright or (ii)
receipt of notice directly from the owner. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2). Once notice is received, or
published in the Federal Register, a reliance party must immediately cease copying and is granted
twelve months solely for the purpose of selling off his or her inventory. Id.
186
Id.
187
Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 16. This leaves no window for Internet based
reliance parties to investigate or verify claims of copyright status before incurring liability. Id.
188
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii).
[A] reliance party may continue to exploit that derivative work for the
duration of the restored copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the
restored copyright reasonable compensation for conduct which would be subject
to a remedy for infringement but for the provisions of this paragraph.
(B) In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the amount of such
compensation shall be determined by an action in United States district court,
and shall reflect any harm to the actual or potential market for or value of the
restored work from the reliance party’s continued exploitation of the work, as
well as compensation for the relative contributions of expression of the author of
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii)–(B) (emphasis added).
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189

The process of determining if the work’s
extraordinary administrative costs.
copyright has been restored, searching for the author, and negotiating a price, can
190
be a timely, expensive, and many times, an impossible process: a hassle which
191
small businesses will infrequently seek to undertake.
Due to the foreign nature
of the majority of restored works, registration and renewals are lost, and copyright
192
owners, especially if they are not famous, are difficult to identify.
These vague
parameters of the public domain, “inject[] uncertainty and confusion . . . into the
193
marketplace, preventing ideas, capital, and commerce from flowing efficiently.”
This is especially the case for those on “shoestring budgets” that are not willing or
194
able to invest in works that could potentially lead to an act of infringement.
Although the statute provides that claims and assertions made against a
restored copyright that are materially false will be void, this does not ease the
195
tensions of the fear of litigation for potential businesses and users.
Congress did
196
not make any attempts to alleviate the associated administrative costs.
Rather,
this legislation instilled a fear of copyright-based interference or liability in the
197
public, which deters business and investment.
Furthermore, by restoring copyrights, Section 514 restricts the utilization and
dissemination of works because the absence of competition directly translates into
198
An unencumbered and reliable public domain supports
higher consumer prices.
189

See supra text accompanying note 92.
The 1976 Copyright Act removed the need for formalities in copyright registration. Brief for
Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 21.
191
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Counsel for the College
Art Association explained to the Copyright Office in a letter, “The vast majority of foreign works were
never registered, so registrations and renewals cannot be found to identify the rights owners,
particularly if they are not famous . . . . In the vast majority of cases, identifying, finding and clearing
rights is realistically impossible.” Cunard Letter, Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 33–34; see
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) (“figuring out who is in the
line of ‘origin’ will be no simple task”); Brief for Google, supra note 143, at 14 (“the difficulty and cost
of even locating the relevant ‘rightsholder’ from whom a license might be negotiated are very often
insurmountable”).
192
For example, the University of Michigan and the Institute of Museum and Library Services,
estimated the cost to determine copyright status of books in the HathiTrust Digital Library published
between 1923–1963, will exceed $1 million. Brief of American Library Ass’n, supra note 136, at 15.
193
Id. at 18. “Where the owner cannot be found to license a work, the music is not likely to be used
due to fear of reprisal.” Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 22.
194
Brief for Public Domain, supra note 104, at 32. “Shoestring budget” refers to parties unable to
handle the large licensing fees or potential lawsuits that may arise from use of the restored works. Id.
Examples of such parties include “documentary filmmakers, independent musicians, educators, nonprofits—and those who archive, organize, or distribute large numbers of works . . . .” Id.
195
17 U.S.C. § 104A(e)(3). “Effect of material false statements.—Any material false statement
knowingly made with respect to any restored copyright identified in any notice of intent shall make
void all claims and assertions made with respect to such restored copyright.” Most parties that would
actually be affected are small and therefore even the threat of a potential lawsuit will deter use.
196
“Congress could have alleviated many of the costs that the statute imposes by, for example,
creating forms of compulsory licensing, requiring ‘restored copyright’ holders to provide necessary
administrative information as a condition of protection, or insisting upon ‘reasonable royalties.’”
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197
Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 16–17. Individuals “have hewed public domain precisely
because these are understood as avoiding complexities, costly historical searches, and legal risk.” Id. at
17; see BOYLE, supra note 148, at 12 (discussing how many libraries will not make available or
reproduce materials unless they can be sure the copyright expired. “They cannot afford to take the
risk.”)
198
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190
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numerous business models and innovative practices because it decreases the
199
transaction costs required to exploit the works.
A decrease in transaction costs
reduces risk and encourages business. Unfortunately, Section 514 has quite the
200
opposite effect.
Big business and investors are an integral part of the copyright industry and
201
Businesses, such as venture
are essential to the creation of many new works.
capital firms, are much more willing to invest if they can be confident about the
boundaries of copyright and the public domain because they negotiate and assess
202
the value of their investments.
However, weak parameters over the public
domain leave open the threat of additional licensing fees and litigation costs for
203
unsolicited use, which daunt business and investment.
The uncertainty of the
return on investment pushes businesses past their accepted level of risk aversion,
204
and consequently hinders their investment in the copyright industry.
Additionally, some businesses’ livelihoods are directly linked to their ability to
205
exploit works already in the public domain.
The cloud over the public domain
creates a grey area of works that could potentially lead to legal battles that most
206
businesses will attempt to avoid.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main question at issue is which view of copyright law the United States
199

Brief of Public Domain, supra note 104, at 18–19.
The amicus brief discusses risk and liability from a business perspective.
In business terms, risk is liability multiplied by probability. Under our current
copyright regime, liability is immense while the probability of liability is
uncertain, but ever increasing. While the value of the Public Domain is
undeniable, a businessperson less dedicated to the sanctity of the Public Domain
would likely have little interest in such an enterprise.
Brief for Project Petrucci, supra note 172, at 9–10.
201
Brief of Heartland Angels, Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14–15, Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470833. For example, the cost of new motion
picture can cost studios in the millions, which would not be possible without outside investment. Id.
Investors will not invest in the development of movies if they are not confident in an environment
where they may be subject to litigation for use of unprotected works. Id. at 15. However, without
investment money, new works (movies) cannot exist. Id.
202
Brief of Heartland Angels, supra note 200, at 9–10. Heartland Angels is a private equity
organization that seeks out small companies to invest in during early stages of company development.
Id. at 1. The legislation especially impacts corporations such as Heartland that try to minimize and
calculate the risk of their investments. Id. at 1–2. Uncertainty in the public domain for corporations
like Heartland discourages such firms from investing in the copyright industry. Id.
203
Id. at 16. Private equity investment companies typically have a reasonable investment-backed
expectation that works will remain in the public domain. Id. Section 514 raises licensing costs for
target companies, which lower the investing company’s return on investment (“ROI”). Id. A negative
ROI will push a company past its willing level of risk aversion, thus thwarting investment in the
creation of new works. Id.
204
Brief of Heartland Angels, supra note 199.
205
Brief for Google, supra note 144, at 4. For example, Google Scholar freely makes legal
opinions in the public domain searchable and available. Id. The Google Art Project showcases highresolution images of public domain art famous museums around the world. Id. Google has made
millions of books available for online reading and download for free. Id.
206
“[T]he Public Domain is a laudable and important enterprise, [but] it is not necessarily profitable
enough to offset its inherent exposure to copyright liability.” Brief of Project Petrucci, supra note 172,
at 9.
200
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should adhere to. Founders of American copyright law based our Constitution on
utilitarian principles that promote the spread of knowledge and information to the
general public. It has always been held that innovation and creativity were of core
importance in an efficiently functioning democratic society. With the passing of
Section 514, the United States digressed from its national roots in order to comply
with an international regime of copyright law. This decision in Golan takes steps
to afford private economic benefit to a few copyright holders at the expense of the
public at large: a notion against constitutional principles. Congress and the
Supreme Court have rationalized American compliance with international law at
the great cost of impeding education and culture, discouraging business and
investment, and creating a grey cloud over the public domain and copyright
industry. Prior to this decision, the United States has never succumbed to the
pressures of international adherence at national expense, and we should not start
now. Again, if it is unfair for the neighborhood to lose out on Granny’s fruit
baskets, it is equally unfair on the American public to lose access to works in the
public domain.

